IP Library Granted Patent US 9,100,418
Granted Patent B2
US 9,100,418 · App. 12/195,737 · Granted Aug 4, 2015

Adaptive data verification for resource-constrained systems

Inventor: Aditya R Karnik (Karnataka, IN)
Assignee: GM Global Technology Operations LLC
H04L63/12H04L67/12H04L63/105
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 9,100,418
App. No.
12/195,737
Granted
Aug 4, 2015
Kind
B2
Abstract

A system and method for adaptively verifying data in resource constrain systems. The adaptive data verification mechanism employs the proper mode of verification adaptively to balance cost/performance requirements plus security requirements. The algorithm uses a belief level for the validity of a received message, and assigns the belief level to a scale between a bona fide message at one end of the scale and a malicious message at an opposite end of the scale. Depending where on the scale the belief level falls determines which validation mode will be used to authenticate the message. In an alternate embodiment, the belief level relative to a scale and the amount of data waiting to be processed in a buffer are both used to determine which mode will be used to validate the message.

Claims (18)

1. A method for authenticating messages received at a receiver device, said method comprising:

establishing a belief level for senders of messages that are received at the receiver device as to the messages validity;

assigning the belief level to a scale where one end of the scale indicates a bona fide sender or message that will be accepted and the other end of the scale indicates a malicious sender or message that will be discarded;

selecting an authentication mode based at least in part on the belief level, wherein one authentication mode includes a blind accept mode for a belief level at or around the bona fide end of the scale, a discard mode for a belief level at or around the malicious end of the scale and at least one mode therebetween; and

performing an authentication process on the message depending on which mode is selected, wherein the at least one mode between the blind accept mode and the discard mode includes modes for validating a PKI signature, validating a lightweight signature and/or performing a consistency check based on local information, and wherein the PKI signature mode is selected if the belief level is near the malicious end of the scale and the lightweight signature mode is selected if the belief level is near the bona fide end of the scale.

2. The method according to claim 1 wherein if the blind accept mode or the discard mode are not available as modes of verification, other verification modes are employed and ranked according to their strength where a weakest mode may be selected at or around the bona fide end of the scale and a strongest mode may be selected at or around the malicious end of the scale.

3. The method according to claim 1 wherein one of the at least one modes is a consistency check mode that determines the authentication of the message based on local information around the receiver device.

4. The method according to claim 3 wherein sensors, GPS data or physics-based models are used to determine the local information.

5. The method according to claim 1 further comprising determining how much unprocessed data is present in a buffer at the receiver device to determine which of the at least one modes will be selected in combination with the belief level, wherein more unprocessed data in conjunction with a belief level near the malicious end of the scale moves the mode towards the discard mode and less unprocessed data in conjunction with a belief level near the bona fide end of the scale moves the mode towards the blind accept mode.

6. The method according to claim 1 wherein the receiver device is onboard a receiving vehicle and the message is transmitted from another vehicle.

7. The method according to claim 1 wherein the modes between the blind accept mode and the discard mode include a mode for performing only a cryptography check, a mode for performing only a consistency check and a mode for performing both a cryptography check and a consistency check.

8. The method according to claim 1 wherein the at least one mode between the discard mode and the blind accept mode is a plurality of different modes that are used to authenticate the message and have different cost and performance levels, where the cost and performance level increases as the mode moves along the scale towards the malicious end.

9. The method according to claim 8 wherein each mode corresponds to a range of belief levels along an interval of the scale.

10. A method for authenticating messages received at a receiver device, said method comprising:

establishing a belief level for senders of messages that are received at the receiver device as to the messages validity;

assigning the belief level to a scale where one end of the scale indicates a bona fide sender or message that will be accepted and the other end of the scale indicates a malicious sender or message that will be discarded;

selecting an authentication mode based at least in part on the belief level, wherein one authentication mode includes a blind accept mode for a belief level at or around the bona fide end of the scale, a discard mode for a belief level at or around the malicious end of the scale and at least one mode therebetween; and

performing an authentication process on the message depending on which mode is selected, wherein one of the at least one modes is a consistency check mode that determines the authentication of the message based on local information around the receiver device, and wherein sensors, GPS data or physics-based models are used to determine the local information.

Assignments (12)
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Nov 7, 2014
From: WILMINGTON TRUST COMPANY
To: GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS LLC
Reel/Frame 034384/0758 →
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Feb 10, 2011
From: GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To: GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS LLC
Reel/Frame 025781/0211 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Nov 8, 2010
From: GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To: WILMINGTON TRUST COMPANY
Reel/Frame 025324/0475 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Nov 5, 2010
From: UAW RETIREE MEDICAL BENEFITS TRUST
To: GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS, INC.
Reel/Frame 025315/0046 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Nov 4, 2010
From: UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
To: GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS, INC.
Reel/Frame 025245/0909 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Aug 28, 2009
From: GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To: UAW RETIREE MEDICAL BENEFITS TRUST
Reel/Frame 023162/0237 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Aug 27, 2009
From: GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To: UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Reel/Frame 023156/0313 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Aug 21, 2009
From: UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
To: GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS, INC.
Reel/Frame 023126/0914 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Aug 21, 2009
From: CITICORP USA, INC. AS AGENT FOR BANK PRIORITY SECURED PARTIES; CITICORP USA, INC. AS AGENT FOR HEDGE PRIORITY SECURED PARTIES
To: GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS, INC.
Reel/Frame 023155/0769 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Apr 16, 2009
From: GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To: CITICORP USA, INC. AS AGENT FOR BANK PRIORITY SECURED PARTIES; CITICORP USA, INC. AS AGENT FOR HEDGE PRIORITY SECURED PARTIES
Reel/Frame 022554/0538 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Feb 4, 2009
From: GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To: UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Reel/Frame 022201/0448 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Oct 23, 2008
From: KARNIK, ADITYA R.
To: GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS, INC.
Reel/Frame 021724/0994 →
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20100049976A1 · Feb 25, 2010