IP Library › Granted Patent US 10,020,937
Granted Patent B2
US 10,020,937 · App. 15/452,902 · Granted Jul 10, 2018

Apparatus and method for the detection of attacks taking control of the single photon detectors of a quantum cryptography apparatus by randomly changing their efficiency

Inventors: Matthieu Legre (Geneva, CH); Grégorie Ribordy (Geneva, CH)
Assignee: ID Quantique SA
H04L9/0852H04L9/002
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 10,020,937
App. No.
15/452,902
Granted
Jul 10, 2018
Kind
B2
Abstract

An apparatus and method for revealing both attack attempts performed on the single-photon detector(s) of a quantum cryptography system and Trojan horse attack attempts performed on quantum cryptography apparatus containing at least one single photon detector. The attacks detection relies on both the random modification of the setting parameters of the said single-photon detector(s) and the comparison of the measured detection probability values for each setting parameter with the expected detection probability values. The modified parameter of the single-photon detector can be its efficiency or its timing of activation for example.

Claims (29)

1. A method for revealing active attack attempts by an adversary on a quantum cryptography system having a single-photon detector, the method comprising the steps of:

randomly varying setting parameters of efficiency or activation timing of the single-photon detector for some of incoming qubits;

collecting multiple detection events;

grouping detection events depending on a value of the setting parameters of efficiency or activation timing applied for each particular event;

calculating a detection probability for each value of the setting parameters;

defining preset intervals based on expected detection probability values for each value of the setting parameter; and

generating and transmitting an electronic alarm to a monitoring system if at least one of the probabilities falls outside of the preset interval.

2. The method of claim 1 wherein the setting parameters of the said single-photon detector of the said quantum cryptography apparatus system are set independently for each incoming qubit.

3. The method of claim 1 wherein the setting parameters of the said single-photon detector of the said quantum cryptography apparatus system are set for groups of incoming qubits.

4. The method of claim 1 wherein the said setting parameter that is varied is the detection efficiency of at least, one of the single-photon detectors of the said quantum cryptography apparatus system.

5. The method of claim 4 wherein the said detection efficiency is set to at least two different values.

6. The method of claim 5 wherein one of the said values of the said detection efficiency is equal, to zero.

7. The method of claim 1 wherein an alarm is triggered if at least one of the detection probabilities corresponding to each of the settings of the efficiency of the said quantum cryptography system does not fall in the preset interval.

8. The method of claim 1 wherein an alarm is triggered if at least one detection probability is registered in the said quantum cryptography apparatus system when the said efficiency is set to zero.

9. The method of claim 1 wherein the said activation timing is set to at least two different values.

10. A method for revealing active attack attempts on a single-photon detector of a quantum cryptography apparatus having an alarm subsystem, the method including the steps of:

(a) randomly choosing setting parameter values of efficiency or activation timing which are passed by the alarm subsystem to the single-photon detector;

(b) grouping the values received by a processing unit on a transmission line according to the setting parameter values passed by the alarm subsystem;

(c) computing a detection probability for each possible setting parameter value of efficiency or activation timing from the data;

(d) comparing the computed detection probability values to expected values and if there is a mismatch between these values, triggering an alarm indicating a probable attack attempt by an eavesdropper.

11. The method of claim 10 wherein the said alarm subsystem chooses the said setting parameters for the said single-photon detector of the said quantum cryptography apparatus system independently for each incoming qubit.

12. The method of claim 10 wherein the said alarm subsystem chooses the said setting parameters for the said single-photon detector of the said quantum cryptography apparatus system for groups of incoming qubits.

13. The method of claim 10 wherein the said alarm subsystem varies the detection efficiency of at least one of the single-photon detectors of the said quantum cryptography apparatus system.

14. The method of claim 13 wherein the said detection efficiency is set to at least two different values.

15. The method of claim 14 wherein one of the said values of the said detection efficiency is equal to zero.

16. The method of claim 10 wherein an alarm is triggered if at least one of the qubit detection probabilities corresponding to each of the settings of the efficiency of the said receiver subsystem does not fail in a preset interval.

17. The method of claim 10 wherein an alarm is triggered if at least one detection is registered in the said quantum cryptography apparatus system when the said detection efficiency is set to zero.

18. The method of claim 10 wherein the said alarm subsystem varies the activation timing of at least one of the single-photon detectors of the said quantum cryptography apparatus system.

19. The method of claim 18 wherein the said activation timing is set to at least two different values.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded May 9, 2018
From: LEGRE, MATTHIEU; RIBORDY, GRÉGOIRE
To: ID QUANTIQUE SA
Reel/Frame 045750/0249 →
Continuity (3)
Division 13877667
Provisional Application 61391127 · Oct 8, 2010
Related Publication 20180152294A1 · May 31, 2018
Cited By (1)
US 12,549,343