IP Library Granted Patent US 12,452,070
Granted Patent B2
US 12,452,070 · App. 18/064,536 · Granted Oct 21, 2025

Method and system for secure interoperability between medical devices

Inventors: Christoph Fischer (Hambrücken, DE); Igor Gejdos (Indianapolis, IN); Christopher Kelsey (Fishers, IN)
Assignee: Roche Diabetes Care, Inc.
H04L9/3226H04L9/088H04L9/3242
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,452,070
App. No.
18/064,536
Granted
Oct 21, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

A method for secure interoperability between an electronic device and a medical device has been developed. The method includes executing a control application configured to provide communication between the electronic device and medical device, receiving user authentication data from an authentication service, receiving a key identifier from the medical device via an untrusted connection, and transmitting a message with an identifier of the user, the user authentication data, the key identifier, an identifier of the control application, and a cryptographic signature to an authorization service. The method further includes receiving a medical device cryptographic key from the authorization service only in response to successful verification of the message to enable at least one of control communication and data communication between the control application and the medical device.

Claims (22)

1. A method for secure medical device interoperability comprising:

executing, with a processor in an electronic device controlled by a user, a control application configured to communicate with a medical device operated by the user;

receiving, with the electronic device, user authentication data generated in response to a user authentication process, the user authentication process further comprising:

receiving, with the electronic device, authentication input data from the user, the authentication input data not being provided to the control application;

transmitting, with the electronic device, an authentication request corresponding to the authentication input data to an authentication service; and

receiving, with the control application, the user authentication data as a user authentication token from the authentication service, the user authentication token being received in response to a successful authentication of the user based on the authentication request;

establishing an untrusted connection between the electronic device and the medical device;

receiving, with the electronic device, a key identifier from the medical device through the untrusted connection;

transmitting, with the electronic device, a message containing data corresponding to an identifier of the user, the user authentication data, the key identifier, an identifier of the control application, and a cryptographic signature of the message to an authorization service, the cryptographic signature being generated using a secret key stored in a memory of the electronic device;

receiving, with the electronic device, a medical device cryptographic key from the authorization service only in response to successful verification of the message that authorizes the user and the control application; and

establishing a trusted connection between the electronic device and the medical device using the medical device cryptographic key to enable at least one of control communication and data communication between the control application and the medical device.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the user authentication token contains the identifier of the user and the user authentication data.

3. The method of claim 1 , the generating of the cryptographic signature further comprising:

generating the cryptographic signature as a hashed message authentication code (HMAC) corresponding to the identifier of the user, the user authentication data, the key identifier, and the identifier of the control application, using the secret key and a cryptographically secure hash function.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the medical device cryptographic key is a public key corresponding to a private key stored in a memory of the medical device.

5. The method of claim 4 , the establishing of the trusted connection between the electronic device and the medical device further comprising:

generating, with the control application, a control application public key and corresponding control application private key;

transmitting, the control application public key to the medical device; and

performing a key exchange protocol to establish the trusted connection between the control application and the medical device based on the control application public key, the control application private key, the public key and the private key of the medical device.

6. The method of claim 1 , wherein the medical device cryptographic key is a shared-secret cryptographic key that is identical to a shared-secret key cryptographic stored in a memory of the medical device.

7. The method of claim 1 , wherein the electronic device is a smartphone.

8. The method of claim 1 , wherein the medical device is selected from the group consisting of an insulin pump, a continuous glucose meter, a spot blood glucose meter, and an electronic medication delivery device.

Assignments (3)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jan 9, 2023
From: FISCHER, CHRISTOPH
To: ROCHE DIABETES CARE GMBH
Reel/Frame 062308/0345 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jan 9, 2023
From: GEJDOS, IGOR; KELSEY, CHRISTOPHER
To: ROCHE DIABETES CARE, INC.
Reel/Frame 062308/0433 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jan 9, 2023
From: ROCHE DIABETES CARE GMBH
To: ROCHE DIABETES CARE, INC.
Reel/Frame 062308/0897 →
Continuity (3)
Continuation PCTUS2021037570 · Jun 16, 2021
Provisional Application 63041603 · Jun 19, 2020
Related Publication 20230108034A1 · Apr 6, 2023
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