IP Library › Granted Patent US 12,463,804
Granted Patent B2
US 12,463,804 · App. 18/338,179 · Granted Nov 4, 2025

Quantum key distribution-based quantum digital signature method and system including trusted node

Inventors: Il Kwon Sohn (Daejeon, KR); Kwang Il Bae (Daejeon, KR); Eun Joo Lee (Daejeon, KR); Won Hyuk Lee (Sejong-si, KR)
Assignee: KOREA INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION
H04L9/0852H04L9/0819H04L9/14H04L9/3247
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,463,804
App. No.
18/338,179
Granted
Nov 4, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

The present disclosure according to at least one embodiment provides a quantum key distribution (QKD)-based quantum digital signature method using a trusted node, the QKD-based quantum digital signature method being performed by a trusted node. The method comprises sharing a first secret key with a message-sending node, sharing a second secret key with a message-receiving node, generating a first trusted-node signature by performing a partial QKD process together with the message-sending node, generating a second trusted-node signature by performing a partial QKD process together with the message-receiving node, and verifying a first message with the shared first and second secret keys and with the first and second trusted-node signatures.

Claims (50)

1 . A quantum key distribution (QKD)-based quantum digital signature method using a trusted node, the QKD-based quantum digital signature method being performed by the trusted node and comprising:

sharing a first secret key with a message-sending node;

sharing a second secret key with a message-receiving node;

generating a first trusted-node signature by performing a partial QKD process together with the message-sending node;

generating a second trusted-node signature by performing a partial QKD process together with the message-receiving node; and

verifying a first message with the shared first and second secret keys and with the first and second trusted-node signatures,

wherein

the first trusted-node signature is a trusted-node bitstring having a first length,

the second trusted-node signature is a trusted-node bitstring having a second length, and

a difference between the first length and the second length is determined based on a loss rate of a quantum channel between the trusted node and the message-sending node.

2 . The QKD-based quantum digital signature method of claim 1 , wherein

the sharing the first secret key, comprises sharing a bitstring having a third length with the message-sending node via a QKD process,

the sharing the second secret key, comprises sharing a bitstring having a fourth length with the message-receiving node via a QKD process,

the first secret key is extracted from the bitstring having the third length, and

the second secret key is extracted from the bitstring having the fourth length.

3 . The QKD-based quantum digital signature method of claim 2 , wherein the bitstrings having the third and fourth lengths are determined based on the loss rate of the quantum channel between the trusted node and the message-sending node.

4 . The QKD-based quantum digital signature method of claim 2 , further comprising:

disclosing a bitstring having a (3-1)-th length, which is part of the bitstring having the third length, and a bitstring having a (4-1)-th length, which is part of the bitstring having the fourth length,

wherein the (3-1)-th and (4-1)-th lengths are the same.

5 . The QKD-based quantum digital signature method of claim 4 , further comprising:

identifying a first error rate from the partial QKD process performed together with the message-sending node, using the disclosed bitstring having the (3-1)-th length, and identifying a second error rate from the partial QKD process performed together with the message-receiving node, using the disclosed bitstring having the (4-1)-th length.

6 . The QKD-based quantum digital signature method of claim 1 , wherein the generating the first trusted-node signature, further comprises generating the first trusted-node signature by randomly extracting a trusted-node bitstring having a (1-1)-th length from the trusted-node bitstring having the first length.

7 . The QKD-based quantum digital signature method of claim 6 , wherein the generating the second trusted-node signature, comprises performing quantum encoding for performing a partial QKD together with the message-receiving node, using a trusted-node bitstring having a (1-2)-th length, which is the entire trusted-node bitstring having the first length, except for the trusted-node bitstring having the (1-1)-th length.

8 . The QKD-based quantum digital signature method of claim 1 , wherein the verifying the first message, comprises: receiving an encrypted first message, which is obtained by encrypting the first message and a message-sending-node bitstring having a first length with the shared first secret key, from the message-sending node; extracting a decrypted first message and a decrypted message-sending-node bitstring having the first length by decrypting the received encrypted first message with the shared first secret key; determining whether the received encrypted first message has been sent by a legitimate sending node by comparing the decrypted message-sending-node bitstring having the first length with a trusted-node bitstring having a (1-1)-th length; sending a secondarily-encrypted first message, which is obtained by encrypting the decrypted first message and a trusted-node bitstring having a second length with the shared second secret key, to the message-receiving node, if a determination is made that the received encrypted first message has been sent by a legitimate sending node; and announcing to the message-receiving node that the message-sending node is a legitimate sending node and signatures for the first message are valid, based on a message-receiving-node bitstring having the second length, disclosed by the message-receiving node, and on the decrypted message-sending-node bitstring having the first length.

9 . The QKD-based quantum digital signature method of claim 8 , wherein the message-receiving-node bitstring having the second length is disclosed on a public board by the message-receiving node after determining, based on a decrypted trusted-node bitstring having the second length and the message-receiving-node bitstring having the second length, whether the secondarily-encrypted first message has been sent by a legitimate sending node.

10 . The QKD-based quantum digital signature method of claim 9 , wherein the determining whether the secondarily-encrypted first message has been sent by a legitimate sending node, comprises determining that the secondarily-encrypted first message has been sent by a legitimate sending node if a number of mismatching bits between the decrypted trusted-node bitstring having the second length and the message-receiving-node bitstring having the second length is less than a second error rate.

11 . The QKD-based quantum digital signature method of claim 8 , wherein the determining whether the received encrypted first message has been sent by a legitimate sending node, comprises determining that the received encrypted first message has been sent by a legitimate sending node if a number of mismatching bits between the decrypted message-sending-node bitstring having the first length and the trusted-node bitstring having the (1-1)-th length is less than a first error rate.

12 . The QKD-based quantum digital signature method of claim 8 , wherein the announcing to the message-receiving node, comprises announcing to the message-receiving node that the message-sending node is a legitimate sending node and the message-sending-node bitstring having the first length and the trusted-node bitstring having the second length are valid, if a number of mismatching bits between the disclosed message-receiving node bitstring having the second length and the decrypted message-sending-node bitstring having the first length is less than a sum of first and second error rates.

13 . A quantum key distribution (QKD)-based quantum digital signature method using a trusted node, the QKD-based quantum digital signature method being performed by the trusted node and comprising:

generating a first trusted-node signature by performing a partial QKD process together with a message-sending node; and

generating a second trusted-node signature by performing a partial QKD process together with a message-receiving node,

wherein

the first trusted-node signature is a trusted-node bitstring having a first length,

the second trusted-node signature is a trusted-node bitstring having a second length, and

a difference between the first length and the second length is determined based on a loss rate of a quantum channel between the trusted node and the message-sending node.

14 . The QKD-based quantum digital signature method of claim 13 , wherein the generating the first trusted-node signature, comprises: generating the first trusted-node signature by extracting a trusted-node bitstring having a (1-1)-th length from a trusted-node bitstring having a first length; and performing quantum encoding for performing a partial QKD together with the message-receiving node, using a trusted-node bitstring having a (1-2)-th length, which is the entire trusted-node bitstring having the first length, except for the trusted-node bitstring having the (1-1)-th length.

15 . A quantum key distribution (QKD)-based quantum digital signature method using a trusted node, the QKD-based quantum digital signature method being performed by the trusted node and comprising:

receiving an encrypted first message, which is obtained by encrypting a first message and a message-sending-node bitstring having a first length with a first secret key, from a message-sending node;

extracting a decrypted first message and a decrypted message sending-node bitstring having the first length by decrypting the received encrypted first message with the first secret key;

determining whether the received encrypted first message has been sent by a legitimate sending node by comparing the decrypted message-sending-node bitstring having the first length with a trusted-node bitstring having a (1-1)-th length;

sending a secondarily-encrypted first message, which is obtained by encrypting the decrypted first message and a trusted-node bitstring having a second length with a second secret key, to a message-receiving node, if a determination is made that the received encrypted first message has been sent by a legitimate sending node; and

announcing to the message-receiving node that the message-sending node is a legitimate sending node and signatures for the first message are valid, based on a message-receiving-node bitstring having the second length, disclosed by the message-receiving node, and on the decrypted message-sending-node bitstring having the first length,

wherein

a difference between the first length and the second length is determined based on a loss rate of a quantum channel between the trusted node and the message-sending node.

16 . The QKD-based quantum digital signature method of claim 15 , wherein the message-receiving-node bitstring having the second length is disclosed on a public board by the message-receiving node after determining, based on a decrypted trusted-node bitstring having the second length and the message-receiving-node bitstring having the second length, whether the secondarily-encrypted first message has been sent by a legitimate sending node.

17 . The QKD-based quantum digital signature method of claim 15 , wherein the determining whether the received encrypted first message has been sent by a legitimate sending node, comprises determining that the received encrypted first message has been sent by a legitimate sending node if a number of mismatching bits between a first message-sending-node signature and a first trusted-node signature is less than a first error rate.

18 . The QKD-based quantum digital signature method of claim 15 , wherein the announcing to the message-receiving node, comprises announcing to the message-receiving node that the first message has been sent by a legitimate sending node if a number of mismatching bits between a first message-receiving-node signature and a second trusted-node signature is less than a second error rate.

19 . The QKD-based quantum digital signature method of claim 15 , wherein

the first message is an email or contract,

the QKD-based quantum digital signature method further comprises completing authentication of an identify of a signer of the first message, if a determination is made that the message-sending node is a legitimate sending node and an announcement is made that the signatures for the first message are valid.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jun 20, 2023
From: SOHN, IL KWON; BAE, KWANG IL; LEE, EUN JOO; LEE, WON HYUK
To: KOREA INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION
Reel/Frame 064002/0872 →
Priority Claims (1)
KR 10-2023-0003408 · Jan 10, 2023 · national
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20240235825A1 · Jul 11, 2024
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