Device signing model
Systems and techniques are provided for secure processing. For instance, a process can include generating a model signing key, wherein the device is associated with a device model, and wherein the model signing key is shared by apparatuses of the device model; obtaining a certificate for a device-unique public key of the apparatus; signing the device-unique public key based on the model signing key; and transmitting the signed device-unique public key for authentication.
1 . An apparatus for secure processing, comprising:
a memory system comprising instructions; and
a processor system coupled to the memory system, wherein the processor system is configured to:
generate a model signing key, wherein the apparatus is associated with a device model, and wherein the model signing key is shared by apparatuses of the device model;
obtain a certificate for a device-unique public key of the apparatus;
sign the device-unique public key based on the model signing key;
transmit the signed device-unique public key to a digital rights management service for authentication;
receive, in response to the transmitted signed device-unique public key, a certificate for authentication from the digital rights management service;
transmit the certificate for authentication to the digital rights management service; and
receive, from the digital rights management service, a digital rights management certificate for accessing content.
2 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein a public key associated with the model signing key was transmitted to the digital rights management service as a part of manufacturing the apparatus.
3 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the processor system is further configured to:
obtain a boot certificate chain of the apparatus; and
transmit the boot certificate chain for authentication.
4 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the processor system is further configured to:
receive an authentication request in response to a request for media access, wherein the model signing key is generated based on the authentication request; and
receive, in response to the transmitted signed device-unique public key, a certificate for authentication.
5 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the memory system includes a set of fuses, and wherein the model signing key is generated based on values blown into the set of fuses.
6 . The apparatus of claim 5 , wherein the values blown into the set of fuses is set during a manufacturing process.
7 . The apparatus of claim 5 , wherein the values blown into the set of fuses is shared by apparatuses of the device model.
8 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the model signing key is generated by a secure element of the processor system.
9 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the processor system is further configured to discard the model signing key after the model signing key is used for signing the device-unique public key.
10 . A method for secure processing by a device, comprising:
generating a model signing key, wherein the device is associated with a device model, and wherein the model signing key is shared by apparatuses of the device model;
obtaining a certificate for a device-unique public key of the device;
signing the device-unique public key based on the model signing key;
transmitting the signed device-unique public key to a digital rights management service for authentication;
receiving, in response to the transmitted signed device-unique public key, a certificate for authentication from the digital rights management service;
transmitting the certificate for authentication to the digital rights management service; and
receiving, from the digital rights management service, a digital rights management certificate for accessing content.
11 . The method of claim 10 , wherein a public key associated with the model signing key was transmitted to the digital rights management service as a part of manufacturing the device.
12 . The method of claim 10 , further comprising:
obtaining a boot certificate chain of the device; and
transmitting the boot certificate chain for authentication.
13 . The method of claim 10 , further comprising:
receiving an authentication request in response to a request for media access, wherein the model signing key is generated based on the authentication request; and
receiving, in response to the transmitted signed device-unique public key, a certificate for authentication.
14 . The method of claim 10 , wherein a memory of the device includes a set of fuses, and wherein the model signing key is generated based on values blown into the set of fuses.
15 . The method of claim 14 , wherein the values blown into the set of fuses is set during a manufacturing process of the device.
16 . The method of claim 14 , wherein the values blown into the set of fuses is shared by apparatuses of a device model.
17 . The method of claim 10 , wherein the model signing key is generated by a secure element of a processor system of the device.
18 . The method of claim 10 , further comprising discarding the model signing key after the model signing key is used for signing the device-unique public key.
19 . A non-transitory computer-readable medium having stored thereon instructions that, when executed by a processor system of a device, cause the processor system to:
generate a model signing key, wherein the device is associated with a device model, and wherein the model signing key is shared by apparatuses of the device model;
obtain a certificate for a device-unique public key of the device;
sign the device-unique public key based on the model signing key;
transmit the signed device-unique public key to a digital rights management service for authentication;
receive, in response to the transmitted signed device-unique public key, a certificate for authentication from the digital rights management service;
transmit the certificate for authentication to the digital rights management service; and
receive, from the digital rights management service, a digital rights management certificate for accessing content.
20 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 19 , wherein a public key associated with the model signing key was transmitted to the digital rights management service as a part of manufacturing.
21 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 19 , wherein the instructions further cause the processor system to:
obtain a boot certificate chain of the device; and
transmit the boot certificate chain for authentication.
22 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 19 , wherein the instructions further cause the processor system to:
receive an authentication request in response to a request for media access, wherein the model signing key is generated based on the authentication request; and
receive, in response to the transmitted signed device-unique public key, a certificate for authentication.
23 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 19 , wherein a memory of the device includes a set of fuses, and wherein the model signing key is generated based on values blown into the set of fuses.
24 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 23 , wherein the values blown into the set of fuses is set during a manufacturing process.
25 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 23 , wherein the values blown into the set of fuses is shared by apparatuses of the device model.
26 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 19 , wherein the model signing key is generated by a secure element of a processor system of the device.
27 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 19 , wherein the instructions cause the processor system to discard the model signing key after the model signing key is used for signing the device-unique public key.