IP Library Granted Patent US 12,531,894
Granted Patent B2
US 12,531,894 · App. 18/523,425 · Granted Jan 20, 2026

Methods, systems, and computer readable media for detecting and mitigating security attacks on producer network functions (NFs) using access token to non-access-token parameter correlation at proxy nf

Inventors: John Nirmal Mohan Raj (Bangalore, IN); Ashish Jyoti Sharma (New Delhi, IN); Jay Rajput (Bangalore, IN); Sonia Kadyan (New Delhi, IN)
Assignee: ORACLE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
H04L63/1441
View Patent ↗
Loading inventors, assignments & file history…
Monitor This Case
Get email alerts when status or documents change.
Order Certified Copies
Most orders are placed with the USPTO same day — all within 24 business hours.
Order via The Patent Place →
Pre-filled with this patent's details
Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,531,894
App. No.
18/523,425
Granted
Jan 20, 2026
Kind
B2
Abstract

A method for detecting and mitigating security attacks on producer network NFs using access token to non-access-token parameter correlation at a proxy NF includes receiving an inter-PLMN SBI request message. The method further includes obtaining, from an access token transmitted with the inter-PLMN SBI request message, at least one network- or service-identifying parameter and obtaining, externally from the access token, at least one network- or service-identifying parameter. The method further includes comparing the at least one network- or service-identifying parameter obtained from the access token and the at least one network- or service-identifying parameter obtained externally from the access token and performing a network security action when the at least one network- or service-identifying parameter obtained from the access token does not match the at least one network- or service-identifying parameter obtained externally from the access token.

Claims (60)

1 . A method for detecting and mitigating security attacks on producer network functions (NFs) using access token to non-access-token parameter correlation at a proxy NF, the method comprising:

receiving, by the proxy NF, an inter-public land mobile network (PLMN) service-based interface (SBI) request message;

obtaining, by the proxy NF and from an OAuth 2.0 access token transmitted with the inter-PLMN SBI request message, at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter, wherein the at least one network identifying or service-identifying parameter comprises a consumer PLMN ID obtained from a subject claim of the OAuth 2.0 access token;

obtaining, by the proxy NF and externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token, at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter, wherein the at least one-network or service-identifying parameter comprises a remote security edge protection proxy (SEPP) PLMN ID;

comparing, by the proxy NF, the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained from the OAuth 2.0 access token and the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token, wherein comparing the at least one network or service-identifying parameter obtained from the OAuth 2.0 access token and the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token includes comparing the consumer PLMN ID obtained from the subject claim of the OAuth 2.0 access token with the remote SEPP PLMN ID obtained externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token; and

performing, by the proxy NF, a network security action when the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained from the OAuth 2.0 access token does not match the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token.

2 . The method of claim 1 wherein:

obtaining the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter from the OAuth 2.0 access token comprises obtaining a producer service name parameter from a scope field of the OAuth 2.0 access token;

obtaining the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token includes obtaining a service name from a 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header of the inter-PLMN SBI request message;

comparing the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained from the OAuth 2.0 access token and the at least one network-identifying parameter or service-identifying parameter obtained externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token includes comparing the producer service name obtained from the scope field of the OAuth 2.0 access token with the service name obtained from the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header of the inter-PLMN SBI request message; and

performing the network security action includes performing the network security action when the service name obtained from the scope field of the OAuth 2.0 access token and the service name obtained from the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header of the inter-PLMN SBI request message do not match.

3 . The method of claim 1 wherein:

obtaining at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter from the OAuth 2.0 access token comprises obtaining a target PLMN ID from the OAuth 2.0 access token;

obtaining the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token includes obtaining a PLMN ID from a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) from a 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header of the inter-PLMN SBI request message;

comparing the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter from the OAuth 2.0 access token and the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token includes comparing the target PLMN ID obtained from the OAuth 2.0 access token with the PLMN ID obtained from the FQDN of the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header of the inter-PLMN SBI request message; and

performing the network security action includes performing the network security action when the target PLMN ID obtained from the OAuth 2.0 access token and the PLMN ID obtained from the FQDN of the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header of the inter-PLMN SBI request message do not match.

4 . The method of claim 1 wherein:

the remote SEPP PLMN ID includes obtaining the remote SEPP PLMN ID from the inter-PLMN SBI request message; and

performing the network security action includes performing the network security action when the consumer PLMN ID obtained from the subject claim of the OAuth 2.0 access token and the remote SEPP PLMN ID obtained from the inter-PLMN SBI request message do not match.

5 . The method of claim 1 comprising, when the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained from the OAuth 2.0 access token matches the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token:

identifying, by the proxy NF and from the inter-PLMN SBI request message, a consumer NF and a producer NF;

determining, by the proxy NF, whether a rate of SBI request messages from the consumer NF to the producer NF exceeds a configured threshold; and

when the rate of inter-PLMN SBI request messages from consumer NF to the producer NF exceeds the threshold, performing, by the proxy NF, a network security action.

6 . The method of claim 1 wherein performing the network security action includes blocking the SBI request message.

7 . The method of claim 1 wherein performing the network security action includes transmitting a fake error response generated by the proxy NF in response to the inter-PLMN SBI request message.

8 . The method of claim 1 wherein the proxy NF comprises a SEPP.

9 . The method of claim 1 wherein the proxy NF comprises a service communication proxy (SCP).

10 . A system for detecting and mitigating security attacks on producer network functions (NFs) using access token to non-access-token parameter correlation at a proxy NF, the system comprising:

a proxy NF including at least one processor and a memory; and

an inter-PLMN SBI request security controller implemented by the at least one processor for:

receiving an inter-public land mobile network (PLMN) service-based interface (SBI) request message, obtaining, from an OAuth 2.0 access token transmitted with the inter-PLMN SBI request message, at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter, wherein the at least one network identifying or service-identifying parameter comprises a consumer PLMN ID obtained from a subject claim of the OAuth 2.0 access token;

obtaining, externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token, at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter, wherein the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter includes a remote security edge protection proxy (SEPP) PLMN ID;

comparing the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained from the OAuth 2.0 access token and the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token, wherein comparing the at least one network or service-identifying parameter obtained from the OAuth 2.0 access token and the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token includes comparing the consumer PLMN ID obtained from the subject claim of the OAuth 2.0 access token with the remote SEPP PLMN ID obtained externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token; and

performing a network security action when the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained from the OAuth 2.0 access token does not match the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token.

11 . The system of claim 10 wherein the inter-PLMN SBI request security controller is configured to:

obtain the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter from the OAuth 2.0 access token by reading a producer service name parameter from a scope field of the OAuth 2.0 access token;

obtain the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token by reading a service name from a 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header of the inter-PLMN SBI request message;

compare the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained from the OAuth 2.0 access token and the at least one network-identifying parameter or service-identifying parameter obtained externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token by comparing the producer service name obtained from the scope field of the OAuth 2.0 access token with the service name obtained from the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header of the inter-PLMN SBI request message; and

perform the network security action when the service name obtained from the scope field of the OAuth 2.0 access token and the service name obtained from the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header of the inter-PLMN SBI request message do not match.

12 . The system of claim 11 wherein the inter-PLMN SBI request security controller is configured to:

obtain at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter from the OAuth 2.0 access token by reading a target PLMN ID from the OAuth 2.0 access token;

obtain the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token by reading a PLMN ID from a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) from a 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header of the inter-PLMN SBI request message;

compare the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter from the OAuth 2.0 access token and the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token by comparing the target PLMN ID obtained from the OAuth 2.0 access token with the PLMN ID obtained from the FQDN of the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header of the inter-PLMN SBI request message; and

perform the network security action when the target PLMN ID obtained from the OAuth 2.0 access token and the PLMN ID obtained from the FQDN of the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header of the inter-PLMN SBI request do not match.

13 . The system of claim 11 wherein the inter-PLMN SBI request security controller is configured to:

obtain the remote SEPP PLMN ID from the inter-PLMN SBI request message; and

perform the network security action when the consumer PLMN ID obtained from the subject claim of the OAuth 2.0 access token and the remote SEPP PLMN ID obtained from the inter-PLMN SBI request message do not match.

14 . The system of claim 10 wherein the inter-PLMN SBI request security controller is configured to, when the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained from the OAuth 2.0 access token matches the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token:

identify, from the inter-PLMN SBI request message, a consumer NF and a producer NF;

determine, by the proxy NF, whether a rate of SBI request messages from the consumer NF to the producer NF exceeds a configured threshold; and

when the rate of inter-PLMN SBI request messages from consumer NF to the producer NF exceeds the threshold, perform the network security action.

15 . The system of claim 10 wherein the network security action includes blocking the SBI request message.

16 . The system of claim 10 wherein the network security action includes transmitting a fake error response generated by the proxy NF in response to the inter-PLMN SBI request message.

17 . The system of claim 10 wherein the proxy NF comprises a SEPP or a service communication proxy (SCP).

18 . A non-transitory computer readable medium comprising computer executable instructions that when executed by a processor of a computer control the computer to perform steps comprising:

receiving, by a proxy network function (NF), an inter-public land mobile network (PLMN) service-based interface (SBI) request message;

obtaining, by the proxy NF and from an OAuth 2.0 access token transmitted with the inter-PLMN SBI request message, at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter, wherein the at least one network identifying or service-identifying parameter comprises a consumer PLMN ID obtained from a subject claim of the OAuth 2.0 access token;

obtaining, by the proxy NF and externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token, at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter, wherein the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter includes a remote security edge protection proxy (SEPP) PLMN ID;

comparing, by the proxy NF, the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained from the OAuth 2.0 access token and the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token, wherein comparing the at least one network or service-identifying parameter obtained from the OAuth 2.0 access token and the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token includes comparing the consumer PLMN ID obtained from the subject claim of the OAuth 2.0 access token with the remote SEPP PLMN ID obtained externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token; and

performing, by the proxy NF, a network security action when the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained from the OAuth 2.0 access token does not match the at least one network-identifying or service-identifying parameter obtained externally from the OAuth 2.0 access token.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Dec 1, 2023
From: MOHAN RAJ, JOHN NIRMAL; SHARMA, ASHISH JYOTI; RAJPUT, JAY; KADYAN, SONIA
To: ORACLE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
Reel/Frame 065734/0655 →
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20250175491A1 · May 29, 2025
References Cited (66)
US 10778527B2 · Assali et al. · 2020 [cited by applicant]
US 11483741B2 · Nair et al. · 2022 [cited by applicant]
US 11533358B1 · Khare et al. · 2022 [cited by applicant]
US 11553342B2 · Mahalank et al. · 2023 [cited by applicant]
US 11825310B2 · Rajput et al. · 2023 [cited by applicant]
US 12425863B2 · Kadyan et al. · 2025 [cited by applicant]
US 20200036754A1 · Livanos · 2020 [cited by applicant]
US 20210111985A1 · Mahalank · 2021 [cited by applicant]
US 20210297935A1 · Belling · 2021 [cited by examiner]
US 20220022040A1 · Mahalank · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 20220053372A1 · Shekhar · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 20220070648A1 · Krishan · 2022 [cited by applicant]
US 20220095111A1 · Fu · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 20220104020A1 · Rajput · 2022 [cited by applicant]
US 20220159464A1 · Rajput · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 20220200847A1 · Bartolome Rodrigo · 2022 [cited by applicant]
US 20220201487A1 · Minokuchi · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 20220247779A1 · Rajput · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 20220272165A1 · Bawa · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 20220287089A1 · Singh · 2022 [cited by applicant]
US 20220294775A1 · Singh · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 20220295282A1 · Rajput · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 20220353263A1 · Choyi et al. · 2022 [cited by applicant]
US 20220360447A1 · Rajput · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 20220360989A1 · Rajput · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 20220361085A1 · Rajput · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 20230052658A1 · Khare · 2023 [cited by examiner]
US 20230141233A1 · Pulipati · 2023 [cited by examiner]
US 20230199497A1 · Krishan et al. · 2023 [cited by applicant]
US 20230284008A1 · Muhanna et al. · 2023 [cited by applicant]
US 20230396602A1 · Wu · 2023 [cited by examiner]
US 20230413052A1 · Aggarwal · 2023 [cited by examiner]
US 20240056506A1 · Bommisetty · 2024 [cited by examiner]
US 20240129876A1 · Sarma · 2024 [cited by applicant]
US 20240381224A1 · Landais · 2024 [cited by examiner]
US 20250126475A1 · Li · 2025 [cited by examiner]
US 20250175800A1 · Kadyan et al. · 2025 [cited by applicant]
US 20250175801A1 · Kadyan et al. · 2025 [cited by applicant]
US 20250234187A1 · Mohan Raj et al. · 2025 [cited by applicant]
US 20250294358A1 · Mohan Raj et al. · 2025 [cited by applicant]
CN 112003912B · 2021 [cited by applicant]
EP 4152691A1 · 2023 [cited by applicant]
WO WO2024125763A1 · 2024 [cited by examiner]
Commonly-Assigned, co-pending U.S. Appl. No. 18/414,455 for “Methods, Systems, and Computer Readable Media for Detecting and Processing Inter-Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) Service-Based Interface (SBI) Messages With… [cited by applicant]
Commonly-Assigned, co-pending U.S. Appl. No. 18/523,487 for “Methods, Systems, and Computer Readable Media for Detecting and Mitigating Security Attacks on Producer Network Functions (NFs) Using Mappings Between Dynamic… [cited by applicant]
Commonly-Assigned, co-pending U.S. Appl. No. 18/523,322 for “Methods, Systems, and Computer Readable Media for Detecting and Mitigating Security Attacks on Producer Network Functions (NFs) Using Error Response Messages”… [cited by applicant]
3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; 5G System; Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) Interconnection; Stage 3 (Release 18) 3GPP TS 29.573 V18.4.0 pp. 1-116 (Sep. 202… [cited by applicant]
3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; 5G System; Technical Realization of Service Based Architecture; Stage 3 (Release 18) 3GPP TS 29.500 V18.4.0 pp. 1-149 (Dec. 2… [cited by applicant]
3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; 5G System; Network Function Repository Services; Stage 3 (Release 18) 3GPP TS 29.510 V18.5.0, pp. 1-382 (Dec. 2023). [cited by applicant]
3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; 5G System; Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) Interconnection; Stage 3 (Release 18) 3GPP TS 29.573 V18.5.0 pp. 1-130 (Dec. 202… [cited by applicant]
3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security architecture and procedures for the 5G System; Stage 2 (Release 18) 3GPP TS 33.501 V18.4.0 pp. 1-326 (Dec. 2023). [cited by applicant]
Keller et al., “Roaming in the 5G System: the 5GS roaming architecture,” Ericsson Technology Review Articles (Jun. 17, 2021). [cited by applicant]
5G Roaming Guidelines, Official Document NG.113—GSM Association Version 2.0, pp. 1-36 (May 28, 2020). [cited by applicant]
Content for TS 33.501 Word version: 18.4.0, pp. 1-8 (Downloaded Jan. 31, 2024) https://www.tech-invite.com/3m33/toc/tinv-3gpp-33-501_e.html. [cited by applicant]
Commonly-Assigned, co-pending U.S. Appl. No. 18/608,071 for “Methods, Systems, and Computer Readable Media for Filtering Inter-Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) Messages at Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) to Imple… [cited by applicant]
3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security architecture and pocedures, 3GPP Draft; 33501-HA0, 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), Jun. 22, 2023. [cited by applicant]
Notification of Transmittal of the International Search Report and the Written Opinion of the International Searching Authority, or the Declaration for International Patent Application Serial No. PCT/US2024/053761 (Feb.… [cited by applicant]
“3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; System architecture for the 5G System (5GS); Stage 2 (Release 18)” 3GPP TS 23.501, V18.3.0, pp. 1-696 (Sep. 2023). [cited by applicant]
“3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Procedures for the 5G System (5GS); Stage 2 (Release 18)” 3GPP TS 23.502, V18.3.0, pp. 1-899 (Sep. 2023). [cited by applicant]
“3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; 5G System; Technical Realization of Service Based Architecture; Stage 3 (Release 18)” 3GPP TS 29.500, V18.3.0, pp. 1-148 (Se… [cited by applicant]
“3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; 5G System; Session Management Services; Stage 3 (Release 18)” 3GPP TS 29.502, V18.4.0, pp. 1-355 (Sep. 2023). [cited by applicant]
“3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; 5G System; Network Function Repository Services; Stage 3 (Release 18)” 3GPP TS 29.510, V18.4.0, pp. 1-373 (Sep. 2023). [cited by applicant]
“3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security architecture and procedures for 5G System (Release 18)” 3GPP TS 33.501, V18.3.0, pp. 1-322 (Sep. 2023). [cited by applicant]
Notice of Allowance for U.S. Appl. No. 18/523,322 (Jul. 18, 2025). [cited by applicant]
Tang, “A Systematic Analysis of 5G Networks with a Focus on 5G Core Security”, Feb. 10, 2022, IEEE, pp. 18298-18318 (Year 2022). [cited by applicant]
Non-Final Office Action for U.S. Appl. No. 18/523,487 (Oct. 23, 2025). [cited by applicant]
Cited By (2)
US 12,720,303 US 12,739,642