IP Library › Granted Patent US 12,621,136
Granted Patent B2
US 12,621,136 · App. 16/844,404 · Granted May 5, 2026

Quantum key distribution protocol with weak measurements

Inventors: Jacob M. Farinholt (Bowie, MD); James E. Troupe (Austin, TX)
Assignee: United States of America, as represented by the Secretary of the Navy
H04L9/0858
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,621,136
App. No.
16/844,404
Granted
May 5, 2026
Kind
B2
Abstract

A quantum key distribution (QKD) receiver is provided for communicating with a transmitter that produces a plurality of entangled photon qubit pairs to send one qubit from each pair randomly alternating between basis states. The receiver includes a first polarized beam splitter, an orthogonal pair of photon detectors, a weak measurement apparatus, a broadcaster, an error rate estimator, and a post-processor. The first splitter receives the one qubit for passage or reflection. The photon detector pair measures the one qubit from passage or reflection. The apparatus performs a weak measurement on the one qubit and includes an impedance device to induce time delay, a pair of mirrors flanking the impedance device, and second and third polarized beam splitters for alternatively passing the one qubit to each other and to the pair of mirrors. The broadcaster for sending weak measurement results from the detectors to the transmitter. The error rate estimator determines whether the weak measurement satisfies a bit error threshold. The post-processor corrects the weak measurement from one of the basis states in response to a shared random key from the transmitter.

Claims (12)

1 . A quantum key distribution (QKD) receiver for communicating with a transmitter that produces a plurality of entangled photon qubit pairs to send one qubit from each pair randomly alternating between basis states, said receiver comprising:

a first polarized beam splitter for receiving the one qubit for passage or reflection; an orthogonal pair of photon detectors for measuring the one qubit from said passage or said reflection; an apparatus for performing a weak measurement on the one qubit, including an impedance device to induce time delay, a pair of mirrors flanking said impedance device, second and third polarized beam splitters for alternatively passing the one qubit to each other and to said pair of mirrors, and a pair of lenses flanking said second and third splitters to rotate the one qubit;

a broadcaster for sending weak measurement results from said detectors to the transmitter; an error rate estimator to determine whether said weak measurement satisfies a bit error threshold: and a post-processor to correct said weak measurement from one of the basis states in response to a shared random key from the transmitter.

2 . The QKD receiver according to claim 1 , further including a clock in said apparatus for determining time degree of freedom of the one qubit.

3 . The QKD receiver according to claim 1 , wherein said rotate the one qubit by ±π/8.

4 . A communication method for quantum key distribution (QKD) with a transmitter that produces a plurality of entangled photon qubit pairs to send one qubit from each pair randomly alternating between basis states, said method comprising:

polarized splitting of the one qubit for passage or reflection via a first polarized beam splitter;

detection measuring the one qubit from said passage or said reflection;

performing a weak measurement on the one qubit, including inducing time delay, alternatively passing the one qubit between second and third beam splitters and a pair of mirrors, and rotating the one cubit via a pair of lenses flanking said second and third splitters;

sending weak measurement results to the transmitter;

determining whether said weak measurement satisfies a bit error threshold; and

correcting said weak measurement from one of the basis states in response to a shared random key from the transmitter.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jun 9, 2023
From: FARINHOLT, JACOB M., DR
To: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Reel/Frame 063902/0883 →
Continuity (2)
Provisional Application 62831361 · Apr 9, 2019
Related Publication 20220329417A1 · Oct 13, 2022
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