Systems and methods of device authentication including features of circuit testing and verification in connection with known board information
A method and system for authenticating a device, board, assembly or system includes obtaining or processing test/scan information provided via extraction of ECID or other unique identifying information regarding a board. A re-authentication process is performed to verify that the board contains only legitimate ECID or other uniquely identified devices, via comparison of re-extracted codes of devices at known positions against a reference record, the reference record being established by an initial authentication process that utilizes information regarding authentic/unique ECID or other uniquely identified codes of devices delivered to populate the board to derive the reference record for the device.
1 . A method of authenticating a board assembly, the method comprising:
obtaining or processing test/scan information provided via extraction of unique identifying information regarding one or more devices on the board assembly, including determination of associated mounted position(s), wherein one or more of the devices are configured with:
a scan or boundary scan component adapted to shift in and shift out test scans of device circuitry,
a unique code adapted to uniquely identify the device,
an interrogation code component adapted to interact with interrogation information applied to the device,
a unique hidden seed element used in a signature generation process for the device and hardcoded into the device, wherein the hidden seed is of unique value per device of a given type, unreadable via test/scan procedures and initially known only to an IC fabricator that fabricated the device, and the hidden seed is unrelated to the unique code and is unrelated to the interrogation information, and
a signature encryption component that provides an output signature code that is unique to the device, for a given interrogation, as a function of algorithmic interaction with at least both of the hidden seed and the interrogation information, wherein the hidden seed is not discernable from the output signature code;
performing one or more re-authentication processes to verify that the board assembly contains only legitimate uniquely identified devices, via comparison of re-extracted codes of devices at known positions against a reference record, the reference record being established by an initial authentication process that utilizes information regarding authentic and unique codes of devices delivered to populate the board assembly as placed at specific positions to derive the reference record for the device, enabling the attestation of the authenticity of such devices; and
verifying that the devices are authentic via application of a signature generation process including an interrogation code to the one or more devices as part of the initial authentication process and/or the re-authentication process, wherein the output signature code provided by the signature generation process cannot be practically replicated even with knowledge of the interrogation code, the encryption algorithm or ECID information.
2 . The method of claim 1 further comprising processing information regarding knowledge of all legitimately shipped codes of a given device type assuring each code's uniqueness, verifying non-duplication over the supply chain from legitimate IC fabricator(s).
3 . The method of claim 1 wherein the reference record is received, directly or indirectly, from an IC fabricator that performed the initial authentication process on a newly assembled board assembly at a board assembly factory.
4 . The method of claim 1 wherein the information regarding the codes includes lot information regarding securely documented lots of devices shipped via a supply chain.
5 . A method of authenticating a board assembly, the method comprising:
performing an initial authentication process that utilizes information regarding authentic and unique codes of devices delivered to populate the board assembly to obtain a reference record of the device, wherein one or more of the devices are configured with:
a scan or boundary scan component adapted to shift in and shift out test scans of device circuitry,
a unique code adapted to uniquely identify the device,
an interrogation code component adapted to interact with interrogation information applied to the device,
a unique hidden seed element used in a signature generation process for the device and hardcoded into the device, wherein the hidden seed is of unique value per device of a given type, unreadable via test/scan procedures and initially known only to an IC fabricator that fabricated the device, and the hidden seed is unrelated to the unique code and is unrelated to the interrogation information, and
a signature encryption component that provides an output signature code that is unique to the device, for a given interrogation, as a function of algorithmic interaction with at least both of the hidden seed and the interrogation information, wherein the hidden seed is not discernable from the output signature code;
obtaining or processing test/scan information provided via extraction of unique identifying information regarding the board assembly;
performing a re-authentication process to verify that the board assembly contains only legitimate codes, via comparison of re-extracted codes of devices at known positions against the reference record; and
verifying that the devices are authentic via application of a signature generation process including an interrogation code to the one or more devices as part of the initial authentication process and/or the re-authentication process, wherein the output signature code provided by the signature generation process cannot be practically replicated even with knowledge of the interrogation code, the encryption algorithm or ECID information.
6 . The method of claim 5 further comprising processing information regarding knowledge of all legitimately shipped ECIDs of a given device type assuring each number's uniqueness, verifying non-duplication over the supply chain from legitimate IC fabricator(s).
7 . The method of claim 5 further comprising performing an attestation step at the board assembly factory, to verify that a newly assembled board assembly contains only authentic ECID components.
8 . The method of claim 5 wherein the information regarding authentic and unique ECID codes includes lot information regarding securely documented lots of devices/components shipped via a supply chain.
9 . A method of performing an initial authentication process of a board assembly, the method comprising:
obtaining information regarding authentic and unique codes of devices delivered to populate the board assembly, wherein one or more of the devices are configured with:
a scan or boundary scan component adapted to shift in and shift out test scans of device circuitry,
a unique code adapted to uniquely identify the device,
an interrogation code component adapted to interact with interrogation information applied to the device,
a unique hidden seed element used in a signature generation process for the device and hardcoded into the device, wherein the hidden seed is of unique value per device of a given type, unreadable via test/scan procedures and initially known only to an IC fabricator that fabricated the device, and the hidden seed is unrelated to the unique code and is unrelated to the interrogation information, and
a signature encryption component that provides an output signature code that is unique to the device, for a given interrogation, as a function of algorithmic interaction with at least both of the hidden seed and the interrogation information, wherein the hidden seed is not discernable from the output signature code;
verifying that the delivered devices are authentic devices;
performing an initial authentication process that utilizes information regarding the authentic and unique codes and/or known associated positions of devices delivered to populate the board assembly to obtain a reference record of the completed scannable board assembly;
storing or processing the reference record for later use;
communicating with an entity that wishes to test the board assembly, including provision of the reference record for comparison against new test/scan information regarding the board assembly to re-authenticate the board assembly; and
verifying that the devices are authentic via application of a signature generation process including an interrogation code to the one or more devices as part of the initial authentication process and/or the re-authentication process, wherein the output signature code provided by the signature generation process cannot be practically replicated even with knowledge of the interrogation code, the encryption algorithm or ECID information.
10 . The method of claim 9 further comprising processing information regarding knowledge of all legitimately shipped codes of a given device type assuring each code's uniqueness, verifying non-duplication over the supply chain from legitimate IC fabricator(s).
11 . The method of claim 9 further comprising performing an automatic attestation step at the board assembly factory, to verify that a newly assembled board assembly contains only authentic components.
12 . The method of claim 9 wherein the reference record is generated by a fabricator that performed the initial authentication process on a newly assembled board assembly.
13 . A method of performing an initial authentication process of a board assembly, the method comprising:
receiving first information regarding one or more devices to be placed on the board assembly by a board assembly manufacturer, wherein one or more of the devices are configured with:
a scan or boundary scan component adapted to shift in and shift out test scans of device circuitry,
a unique code adapted to uniquely identify the device,
an interrogation code component adapted to interact with interrogation information applied to the device,
a unique hidden seed element used in a signature generation process for the device and hardcoded into the device, wherein the hidden seed is of unique value per device of a given type, unreadable via test/scan procedures and initially known only to an IC fabricator that fabricated the device, and the hidden seed is unrelated to the unique code and is unrelated to the interrogation information, and
a signature encryption component that provides an output signature code that is unique to the device, for a given interrogation, as a function of algorithmic interaction with at least both of the hidden seed and the interrogation information, wherein the hidden seed is not discernable from the output signature code;
providing second information, responsive to the first information, to the board assembly manufacturer enabling verification that the one or more devices are authentic devices fabricated by an IC fabricator;
performing processing associated with an initial authentication process that utilizes information regarding authentic and unique codes of the devices and/or associated placement(s) of devices delivered to populate the board assembly in known lot number identified groups, wherein a reference record of the board assembly is obtained after completion of device assembly onto the board assembly; and
storing or processing the reference record for later use, the later use comprising verifying that the devices are authentic via application of a signature generation process including an interrogation code to the one or more devices as part of the initial authentication process and/or the re-authentication process, wherein the output signature code provided by the signature generation process cannot be practically replicated even with knowledge of the interrogation code, the encryption algorithm or ECID information.
14 . The method of claim 13 wherein the first information includes encrypted LOT ID information and, optionally, encrypted board assembly type information and/or encrypted serial number information.
15 . The method of claim 13 wherein the second information includes attestation information confirming whether or not the one or more devices are authentic devices.
16 . The method of claim 13 wherein the second information includes LOT key and/or other decryption information, enabling the board assembly manufacturer to confirm whether or not the one or more devices are authentic devices.
17 . The method of claim 13 further comprising securely obtaining information from one or more IC fabricators regarding one or more ECIDs, LOT information, and/or encrypted content regarding devices placed into a supply chain.
18 . The method of claim 13 further comprising communicating with an entity that wishes to test the board assembly, including provision of the reference record for comparison against new test/scan information regarding the board assembly to re-authenticate the board assembly.
19 . The method of claim 13 further comprising processing information regarding knowledge of all legitimately shipped ECIDs of a given device type assuring each code's uniqueness, verifying non-duplication over the supply chain from legitimate IC fabricator(s).