IP Library Granted Patent US 12,425,189
Granted Patent B1
US 12,425,189 · App. 18/097,396 · Granted Sep 23, 2025

Cryptographic computer machines with novel switching devices

Inventor: Peter Lablans (Morris Township, NJ)
H04L9/0643H04L9/0863
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,425,189
App. No.
18/097,396
Granted
Sep 23, 2025
Kind
B1
Abstract

Circuits defined by n-state switching tables with n>2 are transformed by at least one n-state inverter which may be a Finite Lab-transform (FLT) into a Finite Lab-transformed (FLTed) n-state switching devices. Computer operations defined by transformed or modified n-state switching tables are applied in cryptographic operations, including one or more message digests or hashing methods or computer one-way functions. A keyword is generated from a public keyword by at least one modified known hashing method. A known hashing method may be selected from the group consisting of SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3, MD5, MD6, Blake2, Blake3 and CubeHash. Internal states of known hashing methods are modified to generate unpredictable hash values.

Claims (33)

1. A computing device to process message data and having a transmission channel connected to another computing device, comprising:

a memory enabled to hold processor instructions;

a processor enabled to retrieve instructions from the memory, the instructions enable the processor to perform steps including:

computing a hash value from the message data, wherein the computing includes a transformed n-state computer operation that is a transformation of an n-state computer operation, the n-state transformed computer operation having a first input enabled to receive a first n-state data element and a second input enabled to receive a second n-state data element and an output enabled to generate an n-state output data element with n being an integer greater than 2, the transformed n-state computer operation being created from the n-state operation by a first input of the n-state computer operation having a first n-state inverter, a second input of the n-state computer operation of the n-state computer operation having a second n-state inverter and an output of the n-state computer operation having an output n-state inverter, none of the n-state inverters being identity;

generating the hash value based on one or more n-state data elements derived from the message data, processed by the transformed n-state computer operation and generated on the output of the transformed n-state computer operation; and

transmitting by the computing device over the communication channel connected to the another computing device at least one of the hash value and the data.

2. The computing device of claim 1 , further comprising:

the first and second n-state inverters being identical and reversible and the output n-state inverter being a reversing inverter of the first n-state inverter that is reversible, wherein the first and output n-state inverters in combination establish identity.

3. The computing device of claim 2 , wherein:

n is 2 k (2{circumflex over ( )}k) with k an integer greater than 2, and the n-state computer operation is selected from the group of computer operations consisting of bitwise XOR operations, bitwise AND, bitwise OR operations, bitwise NAND operations, bitwise NOR operations and bitwise EQUAL operations, each on words of at least 2 bits.

4. The computing device of claim 2 , wherein:

the n-state computer operation is an addition modulo-2 w with w an integer greater than 2.

5. The computing device of claim 2 , wherein the computing of the hash value is performed with a dataflow in accordance with a hashing method selected from the group consisting of SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and MD5.

6. The computing device of claim 2 , wherein the hash value and the data are transmitted to the another computing device and the another computing device computes the hash value based on the transformed n-state computer operation from the received data.

7. The computing device of claim 2 , wherein the processing of n-state input data includes implementing the n-state computer operation by a stored n by n switching table.

8. The computing device of claim 1 , wherein the data is transmitted to the another computing device and is processed by the another computing device with the transformed n-state computer operation to generate a password based on the hash value computed by the another computing device for an encryption of a message transmitted between the computing device and the another computing device.

9. The computing device of claim 1 , wherein

the n-state computer operation is a bitwise operation on words of k bits with k an integer greater than 2 and the n-state computer operation is part of a computer operation on q bits with q greater than k.

10. The computing device of claim 1 , wherein the hash value is part of a digital signature.

11. A method, comprising:

computing by a processor in a computing device of a hash value from message data, wherein the computing includes a transformed n-state computer operation which is a transformation of an n-state computer operation, the n-state computer operation having a first input enabled to receive a first n-state data element and a second input enabled to receive a second n-state data element and an output enabled to generate an n-state output data element with n being an integer greater than 2, the transformed n-state computer operation being created from the n-state operation with a first input of the n-state computer operation having a first n-state inverter, a second input of the n-state computer operation of the n-state computer operation having a second n-state inverter and an output having an output n-state inverter, wherein an n-state output element of the transformed n-state computer operation is provided on an output of the output n-state inverter and none of the n-state inverters being identity; and

transmitting by the computing device over a communication channel connected to the computing device at least one of the hash value and the data to another computer device.

12. The method of claim 11 , further comprising:

the first and second n-state inverters are identical and reversible and the output n-state inverter being a reversing inverter of the first n-state inverter, wherein the first and output n-state inverters in combination establish identity.

13. The method of claim 12 , wherein:

n is 2 k (2{circumflex over ( )}k) with k an integer greater than 2, and the n-state computer operation is selected from the group of computer operations consisting of bitwise XOR operations, bitwise AND, bitwise OR operations, bitwise NAND operations, bitwise NOR operations and bitwise EQUAL operations, each on words of at least 2 bits.

14. The method of claim 12 , wherein:

the n-state computer operation is an addition modulo-2 w with w an integer greater than 2.

15. The method of claim 12 , wherein the computing of the hash value is performed with a dataflow in accordance with a hashing method selected from the group consisting of SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, MD5, SHA-3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384 and SHA3-512.

16. The method of claim 12 , wherein the hash value is part of a digital signature.

17. The method of claim 11 , wherein the hash value and the data are transmitted to the another computing device and the another computing device computes the hash value based on the transformed n-state computer operation from the received data.

18. The method of claim 11 , wherein the processing of n-state input data includes implementing the transformed n-state computer operation by a stored n by n switching table.

19. The method of claim 11 , wherein the n-state computer operation is a bitwise operation on words of k bits with k an integer greater than 2 and the n-state computer operation is part of a computer operation on q bits with q greater than k.

Continuity (17)
Continuation In Part 17402968 · Aug 16, 2021
Continuation In Part 17240635 · Apr 26, 2021
Continuation In Part 16532489 · Aug 6, 2019
Continuation In Part 16172584 · Oct 26, 2018
Continuation In Part 15499849 · Apr 27, 2017
Continuation In Part 15442556 · Feb 24, 2017
Continuation In Part 14975841 · Dec 20, 2015
Provisional Application 63420995 · Oct 31, 2022
Provisional Application 63338249 · May 4, 2022
Provisional Application 63301385 · Jan 20, 2022
Provisional Application 63162995 · Mar 18, 2021
Provisional Application 63118374 · Nov 25, 2020
Provisional Application 63067281 · Aug 18, 2020
Provisional Application 62610921 · Dec 27, 2017
Provisional Application 62455555 · Feb 6, 2017
Provisional Application 62435814 · Dec 18, 2016
Provisional Application 62299935 · Feb 25, 2016
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