IP Library Granted Patent US 12,665,744
Granted Patent B2
US 12,665,744 · App. 18/908,321 · Granted Jun 23, 2026

Encryption cloaking with a modified radix-n function for enhanced security

Inventor: Peter Lablans (Morris Township, NJ)
H04L9/0631
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,665,744
App. No.
18/908,321
Filed
Oct 7, 2024
Granted
Jun 23, 2026
Kind
B2
Art Unit
2492
USPC
713/189
Abstract

A cryptographic computer processes a word of p bits in an electronic message as a set of k n-state elements with n an integer greater than 2 and 2{circumflex over ( )}p>n and k>1, with the p bits being characterized as a word of k n-state elements. The computer processes two words of k n-state elements as an radix-n operation that includes a 2 operand reversible n-state operation of which an output is a residue and a 2 operand n-state transition function of which an output is an n-state transition element. An output of the radix-n operation is a word of k n-state elements. The radix-n operation is preferably not reversible and is part of an operation that generates a cryptographic message. A standard cryptographic operation is modified by applying the radix-n operation. The cryptographic message is transmitted over a physical channel.

Claims (32)

1 . A cryptographic device, comprising:

a memory in a first computing device enabled to store data in and to retrieve data from, including instructions;

a processor in the first computing device configured to retrieve instructions from the memory to perform the steps:

implementing an n-state reversible 2 operand function and an n-state 2 operand transition function;

processing as a radix-n operation upon two series of p bits as two words of k n-state elements, the radix-n operation generating with the n-state reversible 2 operand function an n-state residue element and with the n-state 2 operand transition function an n-state transition element, with n an integer greater than 3, k an integer greater than 1 and p an integer being 16 or greater;

generating with the n-state reversible 2 operand function with as input operands the n-state residue element and the n-state transition element an n-state output element in an output word of k n-state elements, wherein the radix-n operation is a non-reversible operation;

generating a cryptographic message from the output word of k n-state elements in an encryption or a hashing of an electronic message; and

outputting the cryptographic message on a physical transmission channel to a second computing device.

2 . The cryptographic device of claim 1 , wherein n=2{circumflex over ( )}k.

3 . The cryptographic device of claim 2 , wherein the n-state reversible 2 operand function is characterized as an addition over GF(n), with GF(n) being a finite field of n different elements.

4 . The cryptographic device of claim 2 , wherein the n-state reversible 2 operand function is a commutative involution that is not characterized as an addition over GF(n), with GF(n) being a finite field of n different elements.

5 . The cryptographic device of claim 1 , wherein the n-state 2 operand transition function is characterized by an n by n n-state lookup table, with no more than n+n/2 and not fewer than n/2 of each n-state element.

6 . The cryptographic device of claim 1 , wherein the k n-state elements are part of a state array in an Advanced Encryption Standard—Galois Counter Mode (AES-GCM) encryption and at least one round in an AES-GCM keystream generation is modified by replacing a bitwise XOR of the two words of p bits in the state array by the radix-n operation on k n-state elements.

7 . The cryptographic device of claim 1 , wherein the k n-state elements are part of a state array in an ChaCha20 encryption and at least one quarter-round in a ChaCha20 keystream generation is modified by replacing a bitwise XOR of the two words of p bits in the state array by the radix-n operation on k n-state elements.

8 . The cryptographic device of claim 7 , wherein the k n-state elements are part of a state array in an ChaCha20 encryption and at least one quarter-round in a ChaCha20 keystream generation is modified by replacing an addition modulo-2{circumflex over ( )}32 of two words of p bits in the state array by the radix-n operation on k n-state elements.

9 . The cryptographic device of claim 1 , wherein the n-state reversible 2 operand function is an FLTed version of another n-state reversible 2 operand function.

10 . The cryptographic device of claim 1 , wherein n-state 2 operand transition function is an FLTed version of another n-state 2 operand transition function.

11 . A computer implemented operation, comprising:

implementing an n-state reversible 2 operand function and an n-state 2 operand transition function on the computer;

processing a radix-n operation on two series of p bits as two words of k n-state elements, the radix-n operation generating with the n-state reversible 2 operand function an n-state residue element and with the n-state 2 operand transition function an n-state transition element, with n an integer greater than 3, k an integer greater than 1 and p an integer being 16 or greater;

generating with the n-state reversible 2 operand function with the n-state residue element and the n-state transition element as input operands an n-state output element in an output word of k n-state elements, wherein the radix-n operation is a non-reversible operation;

generating a cryptographic message from the output word of k n-state elements in an encryption or a hashing of an electronic message; and

outputting the cryptographic message on a physical transmission channel to a second computing device.

12 . The computer implemented operation of claim 11 , wherein n=2{circumflex over ( )}k.

13 . The computer implemented operation of claim 12 , wherein the n-state reversible 2 operand function is characterized as an addition over GF(n), with GF(n) being a finite field of n different elements.

14 . The computer implemented operation of claim 12 , wherein the n-state reversible 2 operand function is a commutative involution not characterized as an addition over GF(n), with GF(n) being a finite field of n different elements.

15 . The computer implemented operation of claim 12 , wherein the n-state 2 operand transition function is characterized by an n by n n-state array, with no more than n+n/2 and not fewer than n/2 of each n-state element.

16 . The computer implemented operation of claim 11 , wherein the k n-state elements are part of a state array in an Advanced Encryption Standard—Galois Counter Mode (AES-GCM) encryption and at least one round in an AES-GCM keystream generation is modified by replacing a bitwise XOR of the two words of p bits in the state array by the radix-n operation on k n-state elements.

17 . The computer implemented operation of claim 11 , wherein the k n-state elements are part of a state array in an ChaCha20 encryption and at least one quarter-round in a ChaCha20 keystream generation is modified by replacing a bitwise XOR of the two words of p bits in the state array by the radix-n operation on k n-state elements.

18 . The computer implemented operation of claim 11 , wherein the k n-state elements are part of a state array in an ChaCha20 encryption and at least one quarter-round in a ChaCha20 keystream generation is modified by replacing an addition modulo-2{circumflex over ( )}32 of two words of p bits in the state array by the radix-n operation on k n-state elements.

19 . The computer implemented operation of claim 11 , wherein the n-state reversible 2 operand function is an FLTed version of another n-state reversible 2 operand function.

20 . The computer implemented operation of claim 11 , wherein n-state 2 operand transition function is an FLTed version of another n-state 2 operand transition function.

Assignments (2)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Nov 8, 2025
From: LCIP JV
To: LABLANS, PETER, MR.
Reel/Frame 072838/0402 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Oct 8, 2024
From: LABLANS, PETER, MR.
To: LCIP JV
Reel/Frame 068836/0775 →
Continuity (3)
Provisional Application 63553456 · Feb 14, 2024
Provisional Application 63548184 · Nov 11, 2023
Related Publication 20250158803A1 · May 15, 2025
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